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Abstract
We experimentally test whether intentional and observable discrim-
inatory pay of symmetric agents in the Winter (2004) game causes low
paid agents to reduce effort. We control for intentionality of wages by
either allowing a principal to determine wages or by implementing a
random process. Our main observations are that discrimination has
no negative effect on efforts and principals do not shy away from using
discriminatory pay if it is observable. Rather, with experience discrim-
ination enhances efficiency as it facilitates coordination among agents.
The only evidence for reciprocity is that subjects receiving a low pay-
ment from a principal (discriminatory or not) exert significantly less
effort.
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1 Introduction
According to the fair wage-effort hypothesis by Akerlof and Yellen (1990)
and also to common perception, being offered a lower renumeration for the
same task than an other identically qualified worker may cause agents to
withhold effort. However, ample evidence for unequal payment of equally
qualified workers exists. A prominent case is that of Lily Ledbetter, who
discovered when nearing retirement that throughout her career her male
colleagues were earning much more.1 Discriminatory pay, i.e. a differential
in payments which can not be justified by aspects relevant for productivity,
is well documented2 and banned by law today in many countries - at least
if it is based on aspects like sex, age or race.
For example, in a survey of some German banks Kampko¨tter and Sliwka
(2009) find that externally hired employees earn up to 20% more than their
internally promoted colleagues. The authors argue that this is due to risk
preferences on behalf of the employees.
In this study we test in a controlled laboratory experiment whether and
how unequal remuneration of symmetric workers affects efforts. We argue
that especially intentional negative wage discrimination results in a with-
drawal of effort, and that employers correctly anticipate this and, thus, shy
away from discrimination if it is observable.
Our working horse is the principal agent game by Winter (2004) with
one principal, two agents, and an interdependent productivity function with
increasing returns to scale. The treatments varied along two dimensions:
intentionality of the wage offer and information about the other agent’s
wage. We control for intentionality by either asking the principal to choose
both wages or by determining them randomly.
We observed that principals neither shied away from discrimination nor
that agents reacted negatively to it. Quite contrarily, over time low paid
workers learned to exert effort when being offered discriminatory wages. Yet,
low wages triggered low effort rates in all treatments but the lowest ones if
wages were determined by the principal and not by a random process.
Already Solow (1979) argues that working efforts do not only depend
1see article in the New York Times on Jan. 30, 2009: ”Obama Signs Equal-Pay Leg-
islation” by S. Stolberg. The Supreme court had previously overruled her compensation
claims for mere technical reasons. Now the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act extends em-
ployee’s rights in case of pay discrimination by extending the possibilities to file discrim-
ination suit. Previous legislation allowed only for filing a discrimination suit within 180
days of the date that the employer first paid her less than her peers. The new legislation
restarts the six-month clock every time the worker receives a paycheck. The case gained
prominence via the attention that President Obama devoted to that case during his cam-
paign. In fact the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act was the frist bill that the new president
signed into law on January 29, 2009.
2See Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008) and Oostendrop (2009) for recent cross country
studies on gender wage gaps.
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on monetary incentives but also on working morale. In a more elaborate
model, relating to Akerlof (1982) and based on psychological and sociological
concepts, Akerlof and Yellen (1990) argue that workers withdraw effort if
their actual wage falls short of their “fair” wage. Here, the perception of
what constitutes a fair wage may relate to the wages colleagues receive. As
shown in many experimental and empirical studies, fairness consideration -
or more generally other regarding preferences - influence individual behavior
considerably (for a survey on other regarding preferences see Cooper and
Kagel, 2009). In labor relations the most illustrative example is the efficiency
wage model which is not only supported by laboratory experiments (see, e.g.
Dohmen et al. (2009)) but also by some (quasi) field experiments.3
Various papers explore the effects of wage discrimination in the labora-
tory. Charness and Kuhn (2007) run gift exchange experiments in which a
principal can offer wages to his two agents individually. In one treatment
workers can observe the wage of the other employee, in the other they can’t.
While efforts do not react significantly to observability of unequal pay there
is evidence that employers shy away from paying different wages if these
are observable. However, in Charness and Kuhn (2007) workers are asym-
metric in their productivity, which may justify different wages and makes it
unlikely that other regarding preferences or norms fully apply. Contrary to
this, we analyze how information about co-worker’s pay affects individual
effort choices in situations in which pay is unequal despite symmetry among
workers.
In his theoretical paper Winter demonstrates that under certain condi-
tions, unequal pay of identical, simultaneously-moving agents may be the
optimal wage mechanism for the principal. More specifically, the discrimi-
natory wage mechanism is the cheapest one guaranteeing full effort by all
simultaneously moving agents in equilibrium in a situation in which this is
efficient.
To understand the intuition behind this equilibrium, note that in the
principal agent game Winter analyzes, not only the expected project return
itself but also expected individual rewards, (paid only in case of the project’s
success) exhibit increasing marginal returns to scale in the number of effort
investing agents.4 Here the cheapest full effort inducing mechanism is to of-
fer a fully discriminatory reward scheme with the following characteristics:
One worker is promised a high reward which is high enough to render full
contribution a dominant strategy irrespective of whether other agents con-
tribute or not. Since the wage mechanism is public knowledge the remaining
agents can infer that the first will contribute. It is then sufficient to offer a
second agent enough to render full effort dominant given at least one other
3See, Fehr et al. (2009) for a review.
4More specifically, workers are offered a reward which is only paid in case the project
is successful. The probability that the project is a success in turn is a convex increasing
function in the number of contributing workers.
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agent contributes and so on. Given the increasing returns to scale nature
of rewards in this game, every (k + 1)-th agent is offered less than the k-th
one for all k ∈ 1, ..., n− 1. Still, note that this wage mechanism is only one
of many equilibria in the entire game.
While several experimental studies have analyzed effects of (knowledge
about) unequal pay on individual efforts, to our knowledge non has con-
sidered this in a case where workers (or agents) are symmetric and where
reciprocity towards a principal, embodied by an other experimental subject,
is possible.
Niklisch (2008) also use a gift-exchange framework but with a real effort
task. In the online computer game world of warcraft, participants were
invited to complete a task against virtual payment. Wages were offered
based on experience and discrimination showed no effect. In Gu¨th et al.
(2008) a principal has the possibility to offer separate wages to permanent
and short term employees. When wages are private knowledge, principals
discriminate. When wages are public, less discrimination is observed.
The mechanism suggested by Winter (2004) requires full information
on all sides. In a real-effort field experiment Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2010)
find evidence for this information requirement. While they find no treat-
ment effect in the real effort task, they do observe a response to increased
wage offers in a laboratory experiment, however only if the payoff structure
(including the payoffs to the principal) is commonly known.
In a different line of literature Goerg et al. (2008) and Klor et al. (2009)
investigate the effects of unequal pay on team production. They base their
experimental design on Winter (2004). However, both studies omit the
principal. We are particularly interested in the role of the principal and the
decision on and response to discrimination. We test for possible effects of
reciprocity. How the knowledge on the options available to the principal and
the wage offer to the co-worker affect effort decision. And how the effects of
interdependence on the return to the other agent affect the decision.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section
introduces the model, section 3 outlines the experimental design, results are
presented in section 4, before section 5 concludes.
2 Model
We consider a simplified version of Winter (2004) with one principal and
only two agents. The principal has a project that returns profit pi if it is
successful and zero otherwise.5 Success only occurs with certainty if both
agents exert effort which is binary, i.e. e = 1 or e = 0 and induces effort
costs of ec with c > 0. If only one agent exerts effort the probability of
5In the experiment we replace stochastic outcomes by expected values to avoid com-
plications due to risk preferences.
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success reduces to α ∈ [0, 1] and if both are lazy it reduces further to α2. In
other words, the project has a convex production technology, so that – in a
comparative statics view – the increase in expected return of an additional
agent exerting effort exceeds that of his predecessor. The effort choice itself
is made simultaneously. More specifically, the sequential game proceeds as
follows:
First the principal offers wage wi to each agent i = 1, 2. Both agents
learn each other’s wage6 before they decide independently their effort level
ei ∈ {0, 1}. Wages are only paid if the project is successful. Effort choices
are not observable in the sense that the principal can not condition his wage
on effort, but it influences the likelihood of success.
We define by k the number of agents choosing ei = 1, by p = α
2−k the
probability of success, where α ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, the expected payoffs of the
principal (VP ) and of each agent i (VAi) are:
VP = α
2−k(pi − w1 − w2) (1)
VAi = α
2−kwi − eic , (2)
where pi > 2c > 0 and α ∈ [0, 1]. Furthermore, we restrict c to
pi ≥ c (1 + α)
α (1− α) , (3)
the reason for which we will justify later. Thus, contingent on their wage
offer and assuming risk neutrality the agents face the following game:
1 0
w2 − c αw2
1 pi − w1 − w2 α(pi − w1 − w2)
w1 − c αw1 − c
αw2 − c α2w1
0 α(pi − w1 − w2) α2(pi − w1 − w2)
αw1 α
2w1
In each cell, the lower left payoff refers to the row player (agent 1), the
middle one to the principal, and the upper right belongs to the collum player
(agent 2). Note that the principal moves prior to the agents by selecting a
wage scheme.
Analysis of Equilibrium Behavior
Assuming risk neutral agents and common knowledge of rationality, this
game has several possible equilibria. We first look at the agents’ individual
6In one treatment the offer to the other agent will not be observable.
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best response functions. It is easy to see that for a very small wage of
w0 < c/(1−α) no effort 0 is the dominant strategy. For an intermediate low
wage w of c/(1−α) ≤ w < c/α(1−α) it is a best response to exert effort 1
if the other agent also chooses 1 and play 0 if the other is lazy, too. Finally,
if w increases even further to w ≥ c/α(1 − α) effort 1 becomes dominant
irrespective of the choice of the other agent. We, thus, define the following
threshold wages
wl =
c
(1− α) (4)
wh =
c
α(1− α) (5)
Let us look at a truncation of the game by eliminating all wage offers other
than wl and wh from the action space of the principal. For now we only look
at the sub-game between the agents. If an agent receives wh, an effort of
1 constitutes a weakly dominant strategy if he expects the other to be lazy
and a strictly dominant strategy if he expects him to exert effort. Thus, if
both receive wh, in equilibrium both exert effort e = 1.
If both only receive wl two equilibria are possible. Either both exert
full effort or both exert no effort. A real mixed equilibrium only exists for
intermediate wages wm with wl < wm < wh.
7
If agents are discriminated, effort by both constitute the only equilib-
rium. Given the dominance of effort for the high paid agent, the low paid
agent can confidently belief that the first agent will exert full effort. The
second agent then best responds by playing 1 as well, despite receiving wl
only.
Next, we turn to the principal’s choice, here every wage combination
can constitute an equilibrium offer. The restriction in equation (2) points
at her participation constraint. For any pi > 2c(1−α) it is beneficial for the
principal to offer wl if this results in effort by all agents. As Winter, we
are, however, primarily interested in the asymmetric wage offer. This is
reflected in condition 3, the participation constraint for the principal in a
discriminating equilibrium.
As already Winter (2004) pointed out this payment schedule is the cheap-
est full effort inducing mechanism available to the principal. This asymmet-
ric equilibrium, advising the principal to discriminate between agents is at
the focus of our investigation. We explore the (possibly emotional) response
of agents to intentional discrimination. Do they reciprocate discrimination
by being less likely to exert effort or are they driven by efficiency considera-
tions? Do principals shy away from discrimination when it is observable? Or
would they take advantage of the asymmetric payment schedule to facilitate
coordination? Does sensitivity for justice play a role in choices?
7In a mixed strategy equilibrium 1 is chosen with probability q = c
w(1−α)2 − α(1−α) .
Note, that for a wage offer of w = wl → q = 1, and for w = wh → q = 0.
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3 Experiment
In the experiment we implemented the simplified version of the Winter
(2004) model discussed above. In addition we replaced expected by de-
terministic payoffs to avoid complications due to risk preferences and used
the following parametrization:
α =
1
2
, c = 9, wL = 21, wH = 42, pi = 100
Note, that the numbers were chosen to make wage offers sufficiently high
to avoid indifference, i.e. wH >
c
α(1−α) and wL >
c
(1−α) . As a result, weakly
dominant relations in the model are replaced by strict dominance.
A detailed payoff table is attached in the instructions in the appendix.
The parametrization was chosen to induce principals to offer a discrimina-
tory wage. More specifically, we set α, pi, wL and wH such that an offer
of (wL, wL) induces a very unfair distribution of final payoffs irrespective of
effort choices. On the other hand, an offer of (wH , wH) leaves very little for
the principal herself. This indeed let to a sufficient number of (wH , wL) or
(wL, wH) offers (i.e. 52% in the FIP and 46% in the PIP treatment).
8
3.1 Design & Treatments
Experiments were carried out at the Max Planck Experimental Lab in Jena
with university students in July 2009. A total of 256 students participated in
eight sessions and one pilot session. The experiment was programmed using
ztree (Fischbacher, 2007) and invitation of participants was managed using
ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) which guaranteed that no subject participated in
more than one session. A translation of the German instructions is attached
in the appendix. Participants were given time to read the instructions in
private before instructions were read aloud to induce common knowledge.
After reading the instructions and before the actual experiment, partici-
pants could simulate the experiment playing all three roles for five minutes.9
Only then roles were assigned and remained fixed throughout the experi-
ment. Participants interacted over 15 rounds in a random stranger design
which guaranteed that no one interacted with someone they interacted with
in the previous round, what was common knowledge. Only one randomly
selected round was paid at the end. Thus, subjects could not hedge over
rounds and discrimination - if it occurred - was salient.
With one exception in which only 27 invited subjects showed up, 30
participants interacted in every session. In two treatments we had one addi-
tional participant acting as a helper. Her/his task was to carry out random
8Treatments will be described in detail below.
9For this a special program was used, relying on the same screens.
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draws. The role of the helper and the computers in the laboratory were
assigned by lot at the entrance.
Our research question is whether, and to what extend pay discrimination
of symmetric agents affects effort choices. In particular, we wanted to test
the impact of intentions and the impact of information about discrimination.
We employed a 2x2 between subjects factorial design to answer this question.
More specifically, the structure of the experiment is as follows. All subjects
receive the same instructions detailing the game, parameters and payoff
functions, illustrated by payoff tables. Since we wanted to test for negative
reciprocal reactions, the instructions are written in a labor market frame.
In our baseline treatment called “full info principal” (FIP), each round of
the experiment proceeded as follows:
1. The principal chooses a wage combination from (w1, w2) ∈ {wL, wH}×2.
2. Both agents are informed about (w1, w2) and independently make an
effort choice ei ∈ {0, 1}
3. Principals are asked for their expectation on the effort decision of both
agents. Agents are asked for their expectation on the other agent’s
effort choice.
4. Payoffs are calculated and subjects are informed about all decisions
and final payoffs.
The beliefs of participants on other players’ choices were elicited by ask-
ing: Please indicate on a scale from 0 to 100 how sure you are that the other
worker will exert effort? The elicited beliefs were not incentivized as this
would have complicated the experiment and to avoid complications due to
the known interaction of scoring rules with risk preferences (see Offerman
et al. (2009) for a discussion).
The design was varied along two dimensions. In one dimension we varied
information, while in the other we manipulated intentionality of wage offers.
Under full information (FI) each agent receives information on both his own
and the other agent’s wage, while under partial information (PI) he is only
informed about his own wage.10 The second dimension is intentionality of
the wage offer. Here we varied whether the principal (P) or a random mech-
anism (R) determined the wage combination. Thus, we had four treatments
which we will refer to as: full info principal (FIP), full info random (FIR),
partial info principal (PIP), and partial info random (PIR). All treatments
were compared between subjects, i.e. every subject only confronted one of
the four treatments.
10During the game an agent only knew his own wage and at the end of the round he
was only informed about whether the other agent has exerted effort and his own payoff.
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principal random
full info FIP FIR
partial info PIP PIR
In treatments FIR and PIR the decision of the principal was replaced by
a random move. Here each wage combination (differentiating (wL, wH) and
(wH , wL) occured with likelihoods rLL, rLH , rHL and rHH (with
∑
i,j∈{L,H} rij =
1) equal to the observed frequencies of these offers in treatment FIP and PIP,
respectively. In the PIR treatment, workers were only informed about their
own wage offer.
The random draw itself was carried out by the helper subject using an
urn with 100 numbered chips. The helper only received instructions about
the random draws and did not know the content of the experiment.11 To ob-
tain sufficient variation for the random move we combined a randomization
by computer with a proper randomization by the helper. More specifically,
at the beginning of each round participants first saw a table matching each
chip numbered from 1 to 100 to a wage combination. The number of lots
assigned to a wage combination was equivalent to it’s commonly known like-
lihood. Every matching table was randomly and independently created for
every group and round by the computer software, what subjects knew. The
helper subject publicly drew a numbered chip from a bowl with 100, an-
nounced the number and entered it into the computer. This number then
determined for each group individually the wage combination.
After all 15 repetitions the round relevant for payment was determined
by a random draw in front of the subjects. The experiment was concluded
by a questionnaire, where justice sensitivity of the subjects of elicited. In
particular we used the Schmitt et al. (2005) scale to elicit sensitivity for
victim, observer and beneficiaries.
4 Results
We ran a total of 8 session in the computer laboratory of the Max Planck
Institute in Jena, two for each of the four treatment combinations. Sub-
jects were students recruited from the Friedrich Schiller Universita¨t Jena
and no one participated in more than one session. With one exception, in
every session 30 subjects interacted with each other over 15 repetitions in a
random stranger rematching which guaranteed that no one interacted with
someone in two consecutive rounds. This matching procedure was common
knowledge. Unfortunately in one session for treatment combination PIR
only 27 subjects participated in the experiment itself. Each session lasted
between about 55 and 70 Minutes including admission and payment of all
11He (or she) had to leave the room while the instructions were read aloud to the
participants.
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subjects. On average subjects earned in total12 e9.91 with minimum e4.50,
maximum e23.40 and standard deviation 4.67.
4.1 Wage Offers
We first look at the wage combinations principals offered to the agents in
treatments FIP and PIP. The barplots in Figure 1 show the relative fre-
quency of each wage combination separately for every period and treatments
FIP and PIP . In addition the frequency over the entire experiment, i.e.
periods 1 to 15, are shown in the last bar to the right. In both treat-
ments the most common wage combination was the (21, 21) offer, followed
by the two discriminating offers. The combination which paid both the high
wage was chosen rather rarely. Averaged over all repetitions, there is no
significant13 treatment effect.14 In treatment FIP the frequencies for com-
binations (21, 21), (21, 42), (42, 21), and (42, 42) are 45.67%, 26.33%, 26% ,
and 2% , and in treatment PIR the numbers are 50.33%, 24.33%, 22.33% ,
and 3% , respectively.
What, however, is striking is a repetition effect in treatment FIP . With
experience principals tend to chose a discriminating offer more often. This
is especially the case in the last six periods what results in significant dif-
ferences in offers between FIP and PIP .15
Observation 1 Observability of discrimination does not reduce the frequency
of discriminatory offers. On the contrary, in later rounds proposers tend to
discriminate more when the wage of the other worker is observable.
4.2 Effort Choices - Descriptive Analysis
We now turn to our main variable of interest, the effort choices made by the
agents. We essentially employed a 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 design with the following
four dimensions of which the first two were determined endogenously:
1. Size of payment: low vs. high.
2. Discrimination: being paid the same or a different wage.
12This includes the e4.00 subjects received for the post-questionnaire.
13If not mentioned otherwise, significance levels are set to threshold α = 2.5% through-
out the following analysis and p-values above that level will not be reported.
14Both, a Pearson’s Chi-squared test and a Fisher’s exact test can not reject the null of
equal frequency distributions between treatments.
15Looking only at the last three or five rounds, using a Fisher’s exact test, there is a
significant (p = .0135% and p = .0110%, respectively) difference between treatments which
is not the case if one looks at all previous rounds combined either over multiples of three
or five rounds. Even more specifically, one sided Fisher tests comparing only the frequency
of equal offers versus discriminatory ones in the last three or five rounds find significantly
more discrimination in treatment FIR (p = .0023 and p = .0012, respectively).
9
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Figure 1: Frequency of wage combinations in FIP and PIP
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3. Observability of discrimination.
4. Intentionality of payment: Wage is determined either by the principal
or a random process.
To understand behavior better, we will first analyze effort decisions sep-
arately along these dimensions before running a more detailed regression
analysis including all dimensions simultaneously in the subsequent section.
Figure 2 shows the relative frequencies of effort by wage combination,
role, and treatment. The heights of the bars represent the relative fre-
quency of effort and the numbers at the bottom indicate how often this
treatment/wage combination occurred. For example, in treatment PIP ,
agents A2 confronted (21, 42) a total of 73 times and exerted effort in 85%
of those cases. Note, however, that in PIP and PIR an agent did not know
the wage of the other. Thus, in the example an A2 could not distinguish
between (21, 42) or (42, 42). This is reflected in very similar frequencies
of effort for cases which are indistinguishable for the agents. Fisher ex-
act tests confirm this, as the null hypothesis of equal frequencies can not
be rejected. Also, effort choices are invariant with respect to names, more
specifically, A1 and A2 subjects who face the same situation (from their in-
dividual perspective) behave identically.16 Thus, we will treat the two agent
roles interchangeably.
Effects of the Wage Size
We first look at whether and to what extend agents react to the wage size.
This is important as it shows whether subjects understood the fundamen-
tally different incentives rendered by low vs. high payment. A strong effect
is obvious in treatment PIP , what is confirmed by Fisher exact tests for all
repetitions but round 2 and 5. In treatment PIR this effect is much less
pronounced, but still significant.17 In the full information treatments this
comparison becomes a bit more difficult as here the reaction to getting a
small vs. high wage potentially interacts with information effects. For now
we ignore this interaction and only compare frequencies of effort choices
conditional on an agents own wage. With only a few exceptions,18 effort
frequencies are significantly higher if an agent receives 42 instead of 21 in
every round of treatment FIP and FIR.
While this suggests that reactions go at least in the right direction the
question remains whether dominance of effort for a wage of 42 is mirrored
16Fisher exact tests on the frequency of effort choices could not find significant differ-
ences.
17The effect is significant throughout if one always combines data of three consecutive
rounds.
18In treatment FIP (FIR) the effort frequencies do not differ significantly in the first
and last (first) repetition only.
11
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Figure 2: Frequency of Full Effort by Wage Combination, Role, and Treat-
ment.
Note: Contrary to this illustration, in treatments PIP and PIR agents only know their
own wage.
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in the data. We compared actual effort frequencies of agents who received a
wage of 42 to a baseline frequency of 97.5%, separately for each treatment
and repetition.19 One sided binomial tests can not reject the null of a 97.5%
effort frequency (against the alternative of a lower rate) in every repetition
in treatments FIR, FIP and PIR. Surprisingly, however, in periods 2, 5, 6,
11, 14 of treatment PIP the effort frequency is significantly smaller. Over
all periods and at a 2.5% confidence level we find that in PIP the true rate
of rational behavior is below 91.06%.
Observation 2 In all treatments agents are more likely to exert effort if
they receive the high wage. Also, in FIR, FIP and PIR effort rates of
agents with the high wage are not significantly smaller than 97.5%. In PIP ,
however, effort rates are significantly lower, indicating irrational behavior.
Intentionality of Wages
We now turn to the question whether agents react to how the wage is deter-
mined. Let us first analyze the private information treatments. Comparing
effort frequencies of agents that receive a wage of 21 in treatment PIP with
treatment PIR reveals a strong and significant negative reciprocity towards
a subject decider: In treatment PIP in only 28.7% of all cases agents exert
effort compared to 59.5% in PIR.20 For offers of 42 a similar effect can be
observed, i.e. higher effort rates in treatment PIR than in PIP . However,
this effect is insignificant throughout.
We now turn to the full information treatments. Again we observe a
significant negative reciprocity effect if an agent is offered only 21. This
is especially true for combination (21, 21) for which the frequency of effort
is significantly higher when the wage combination was determined by the
randomization device (FIR) rather than by a human principal (FIP ).21 A
similar significant effect holds if an agent is negatively discriminated, i.e. for
cases in which a subject gets 21 and the other 42. However, this effect is
not significant for individual rounds. In moving bands of five consecutive
rounds this effect is significant for early rounds only and becomes insignif-
icant starting over the combined rounds 7 to 11. This is due to a gradual
increase in efforts under discriminatory pay in treatment FIP with experi-
ence. This can be seen in Figure 3a which plots relative frequencies of effort
of agents who received 21 and were informed that the other agent received
19Clearly, a hard nosed theorist would compare actual frequencies to a rate of 100%.
This hypothesis must clearly be rejected for many rounds. We, however, want to allow
for a minor error rate of 2.5%.
20Looking at individual repetitions this effect is significant in eight rounds, and, if one
always combines data from three consecutive rounds the effect is significant throughout.
21Looking at individual periods, in eleven of the fifteen repetitions a Fisher exact test
rejects the null hypothesis of equal effort frequencies (p < .001 for data combined over all
periods).
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42, separately for every period in treatments FIP and FIR. Quite contrary
to this and as can be seen in Figure 3b, efforts for wage combination (21,
21) gradually decrease over time.
We summarize
Observation 3 A subject receiving a low payment is more likely to exert
effort if his wage was determined by the randomization device rather than
by another subject.
and
Observation 4 In treatment FIP under negative discriminatory pay agents
become significantly more likely to exert effort with experience.
Discrimination and Information Effects
We now turn to the question whether it makes a difference that an agent who
gets 21 knows that the other gets 42 or not. According to our parametriza-
tion a risk neutral agent receiving a low wage should exert effort whenever he
believes that the likelihood of the other agent exerting effort exceeds 0.7143.
We already established that in all treatments except for PIP agents receiv-
ing 42 contributed with a frequency not significantly different from 0.975.
But also in treatment PIP effort rates are significantly higher than 0.7143
throughout. The same holds if one only looks at effort frequencies of the
high paid agents for wage combinations (21, 42) and (42, 21) in the full in-
formation treatments. Thus, a low paid agent who knows that the other
agent receives 42 should always contribute.
From Figure 1 one can already see that in both FI treatments effort
rates of the low paid agents under discriminatory pay are significantly below
97.5% in every round. But are agents who receive a low wage more likely to
exert effort if they know that the other agent receives a high payment?
We look at the FI treatments and compare the frequency of effort in case
of the symmetric (21, 21) combination with that for cases in which the agent
is negatively discriminated. Strikingly, although insignificant (p = 0.0505),
in FIR the effect is reversed as in 71.77% of the symmetric case (21, 21)
agents exert effort, compared to only 62.16% in the asymmetric one.
In FIP on the other hand, the effect is significant (p < 0.0001) and in the
expected direction with 24.82% in the symmetric case, compared to 54.14%
in the asymmetric. A closer inspection of individual rounds confirms our
previous observation that this effect evolves with experience: For individual
rounds data, this effect is weakly significant (p < 0.05) in rounds 10 to 15
and highly significant (p < 0.025) starting in rounds 8 and 9 if one combines
data from two consecutive rounds.
Observation 5 Known negative discrimination increases efforts in treat-
ment FIP with increasing experience of subjects, but not in treatment FIR.
14
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This observation is a central result of our paper. In treatment FIP low
paid agents learn that high payment of the other agent increases incentives
to contribute. Strikingly, such learning is not present in FIR.
We can make similar comparisons between full information and partial
information treatments. We compared effort rates in case of negative dis-
crimination in treatment FIP with effort rates for a low payment in treat-
ment PIP . Looking at data combined over all periods, observable negative
discrimination in FIP results with 54.14% in significantly more effort than
in PIP with only 28.73% (p < 0.001). Looking at data from individual
rounds this is only significant for the last 5 periods. A similar comparison
between FIR and PIR does not show any significant differences (73.24%
vs. 65.09%)
Similarly, how do effort rates in case of wage combination (21, 21) in
FI treatments compare to those for a low payment in the PI treatments?
Interestingly, there are no significant differences, neither in the − − P , nor
in the −−R treatments.
There are also some further experience effects. Effort rates for (21, 21)
offers in FI, and for low offers in the PI treatments decrease over time.
Observation 6 In addition to observation 5 we observe the following in-
formation effects:
1. Effort rates for (21, 21) offers in an FI − x treatment are not sig-
nificantly different from those for low offers in the equivalent PI − x
treatment.
2. Effort rates of negatively discriminated agents in FIR and in early
rounds in FIP are not significantly different from those of low paid
agents in the equivalent PI treatment.
3. In later rounds, effort rates of negatively discriminated agents in FIP
are significantly higher than those of low paid agents in PIP .
4. Effort rates for (21, 21) offers in the FI, and for low offers in the PI
treatments, decrease with experience.
4.3 Effort Choices - Regression Analysis
Following the rather descriptive analysis from the previous section we now
turn to a more controlled analysis. So far results indicate that agents re-
ciprocate a low payment coming from a principal with less effort and that
in FIP with experience low paid agents become more likely to exert effort
if the other agent receives 42. Thus, so far we have little reason to believe
that subjects actually reciprocate intentional negative discriminatory pay.
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Table 1 lists the estimates of linear probability models (LPM) regressing
the effort decisions on several regressors.22 Significant coefficients (p <
.025) are highlighted by a * and p-values are reported in parentheses. All
models include a random effect on every subject,23 whose relevance was
confirmed by Lagrangian multiplier tests. Furthermore, every estimation
includes fixed effects for every period and for role A2 (not reported). Models
were estimated using heteroscedasticity robust generalized least squares.
All regressors denoted by D are dummy variables. Variable DP indicates
that the offer was made by the principal, DI that the wage of the other agent
was observable, D21 that the agent received a low wage, and Dw1 6=w2 that
the two wages differed. Variable t stands for the period and E[ej = 1]
for the reported belief that the other agent will exert effort. Combinations
of variables indicate interaction effects. Note the equivalence between the
four main dimensions of our experiment and the first four variables in the
estimations.
Let us first look at model (1) in Table 1. Most of our previous results are
confirmed: A low paid worker is generally significantly less likely to exert
effort (D21). If in addition the low wage was determined by the principal the
tendency to exert effort is reduced further (DPD21). As before, the mere fact
of being discriminated (be it observable or not) has no effect irrespective of
whether it is positive or negative discrimination (Dw1 6=w2 and D21Dw1 6=w2).
The same holds if one only looks at observable discrimination. Interestingly,
the partial effect of observable negative discrimination (DID21Dw1 6=w2) is
positive, though insignificant.
With respect to our main research question, the coefficient we are most
interested in is that on DPDID21Dw1 6=w2 as it measures the effect of the
joint occurrence of intentionally determined and observable negative dis-
crimination above the sum of all individual sub-effects. A negative coeffi-
cient would proof our hypothesis of a negative reciprocity to discrimination.
However, our estimation result shows that it is positive. Thus, indicating
that subjects react optimally to negative discrimination by increasing their
tendency to exert effort. Although we already observed that the coefficient
for observable negative discrimination in general is positive, again it is only
significant if the discrimination came from the principal. This confirms our
previous observations that in FIP agents learn to react more rational to
discrimination. Something we do not find in FIR.
The interaction effect of DPDID21Dw1 6=w2 with variable t in model (2) il-
lustrates the learning effect.24 Including DPDID21Dw1 6=w2t in the regression
22Generalized linear mixed effects estimations were infeasible due to convergence prob-
lems. As LPMs deliver good approximations and robust estimates, and the share of
predictions outside the unit interval never exceeded 2.95% , we decided to use LPM in-
stead.
23The standard deviation of the random effects is reported as σre
24Note that the regressions include dummies for every period, making the inclusion of
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Table 1: Regression Analysis of Effort Decisions
regressor (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DP (principal) -.0671 -.0672 -.0751 -.0749 .0002
(.379) (.381) (.063) (.065) (.996)
DI (Info) .0945 .1066 .0368 .0387 .0395
(.220) (.167) (.373) (.351) (.599)
D21 -.3444* -.3432* -.3510* -.3514* -.3323*
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Dw1 6=w2 .0335 .0370 .0149 .0161 .0173
(.551) (.510) (.443) (.408) (.366)
DPDI -.0824 -.0934 – – –
(.516) (.466)
DPD21 -.2441* -.2435* -.2354* -.2347* -.2522*
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
DPDw1 6=w2 -.0181 -.0192 – – –
(.721) (.705)
DID21 .0474 .0348 .0931* .0915* .0677
(.504) (.624) (.021) (.024) (.087)
DIDw1 6=w2 -.0758 -.0889 – – –
(.276) (.203)
D21Dw1 6=w2 .0095 .0081 – – –
(.871) (.891)
DID21Dw1 6=w2 .0196 .0325 – – –
(.814) (.698)
DPDID21 -.0706 -.0618 -.1479* -.1516* -.0808
(.538) (.592) (.015) (.013) (.168)
DPDIDw1 6=w2 .1089 .1242 – – –
(.327) (.268)
DPDID21Dw1 6=w2 .2045 -.0737 .2664* .0049 -.0994
(.078) (.598) (.000) (.956) (.256)
DPDID21Dw1 6=w2t – .0294* – .0292* .0231*
(.000) (.000) (.004)
E[ej = 1] – – – – .0035*
(.000)
σre .2379 .2388 .2414 .2421 .2220
σu .3418 .3405 .3415 .3402 .3311
R2 .2808 .2856 .2830 .2856 .3457
% correctly predicted 74.13 74.89 74.15 74.89 76.49
Note: Linear probability models including random effect on each subject
(standard deviation reported as σre - relevance of random effects confirmed by
Lagrangian multiplier tests) and fixed effects for every repetition (not reported)
and role A2. Estimated using a heteroscedasticity robust generalized least square
method. Values in parentheses are p-values. * significant at 2.5% level. ”(.000)”
means p < .001
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reduces the effect on DPDIDw1 6=w2 substantially, making it even negative,
though still insignificant. As expected the coefficient on DPDIDw1 6=w2t itself
is significant and positive, confirming the learning effect.
Models (3) and (4) are the reduced versions of (1) and (2) which still in-
clude the main effects but are reduced by exclusion of insignificant and non
explanatory variables in order to account for potential efficiency loss. Ob-
serve that in model (3) the coefficient on DPDIDw1 6=w2 is now positive and
significant. Another result is that now DID21 is significant indicating that in
treatments with feedback efforts for a low wage are significantly higher. As
DPDID21 is negative and the joint coefficient DPDID21+DID21 = −0.0548
is insignificant (p = .326), this effect is, however, restricted to treatment
FIR.
We can use an additional variable to control for aspects which may drive
behavior. In model (5) we included the reported subjective probability that
the other agent will contribute (E[ej = 1]). The propensity to exert effort in-
creases significantly with increasing expectation that the other exerts effort.
Interestingly now the intercept effect DPDID21D(w1 6= w2) becomes nega-
tive, indicating that at least in early rounds there is a negative reciprocal
reaction to discrimination observable. Still, this effect remains insignificant.
The effects on DPDID21 and DID21 now become insignificant which indi-
cates that they were primarily due to different expectations.
We also tested for interaction effects of the belief with the two exoge-
nous treatment dummies DP and DI which turned out to be insignificant.
Unfortunately, due to simultaneity we have reasons to assume that the be-
lief variable is endogenous. Unfortunately we couldn’t find nor construct a
truly exogenous and relevant (not weak according to Hansen’s J-statistic)
instrument to control for endogeneity.
As a final test for whether there exists a negative reaction to discrimi-
nation we ran Probit estimations of effort decisions in treatment FIP and
FIR only. The results of these estimations which again include random ef-
fects on each subject and fixed effects for every period, are reported in Table
2. Although we find some evidence of a negative reaction in early rounds in
variable D21Dw1 6=w2 in models (1) and (2), this remains again insignificant.
Furthermore the results in Table 2 confirm our previously observed ex-
perience effects. In FIP the propensity to exert effort under negative dis-
crimination increases significantly over time,25 whilst the tendency to exert
effort under equal but low pay significantly decreases over time.26 No such
experience effect can be found in treatment FIP .
Observation 7 The regression analysis confirms that there is no negative
reaction to observable discrimination. On the contrary, with experience low
regressor t itself obsolete.
25Joint significance of t+D21t+D21Dw1 6=w2t = .0845 at p = .007.
26Joint significance of t+D21t = −.1025 at p = .001.
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Table 2: Probit Regression of Effort Decisions
treatment FIP FIR
regressor (1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 1.025 -.0145 5.436 2.950
(.129) (.986) (.985) (.983)
D21 -1.164 -1.090 -3.632 -2.791
(.091) (.195) (.990) (.984)
Dw1 6=w2 .2693 .7630 -3.335 -2.048
(.686) (.349) (.991) (.988)
D21Dw1 6=w2 -.7305 -1.6648 2.477 1.087
(.327) (.064) (.993) (.994)
t .0773 .0649 .2927 .3852
(.089) (.187) (.063) (.058)
D21t -.1798* -.1438* -.3706* -.4406
(.001) (.014) (.021) (.033)
D21Dw1 6=w2t .1807* .1371* .0943 .0603
(.000) (.001) (.029) (.186)
E[ej = 1] – .0212* – .0244*
(.000) (.000)
logL -253 -228 -184 -165
% corr. predicted 74.2% 77.2% 79.4% 79.5%
Note: Probit models including random effect on each subject (standard
deviation reported as σre - relevance of random effects confirmed by Lagrangian
multiplier tests). Reported coefficients are parameter estimates from restricted
maximum likelihood estimation. Values in parentheses are p-values. * significant
at 2.5% level. ”(.000)” means p < .001
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paid agents become more likely to exert effort if they know that the other
agent is paid highly. This, however is only true in treatment FIP and not
in FIR.
In addition we wanted to test whether effort choices in one period are
not mere reactions to current wages but also to experienced wages in the
past, especially discriminatory ones. We constructed a net-discrimination
variable which accumulates experienced discrimination in previous periods
by adding -1 or +1 for every time an agent received less, respectively more
than the other agent.27 This regressor turned out to be insignificant not
only in the partial-, but also in the full information treatments.
4.4 Beliefs
In the previous section, we observed that submitted beliefs are correlated to
the effort decision. However, this should not be understood as an indication
of rationality. Overall, in only 64% of all cases an agent exerted effort after
submitting a belief of effort of the other agent of 71.43% or higher. This
ratio is much higher in treatments where the randomization device defined
the wages. More specifically in our four treatments FIP , FIR, PIP and
PIR the ratios are 57%, 80%, 48% and 71%, respectively.
We now look at belief formation. In Table 3 we report the results of the
regression analysis of reported beliefs about the likelihood that the other
agent will exert effort. Here Dj42 indicates that the other agent was offered
w = 42, what, however, was only known to the agent for DI = 1, i.e. in full
information treatments.
As rationality predicts, knowing that the other agent receives 42 in-
creases the expectation of effort significantly (DIDj42). Interestingly, in
treatments in which the principal decides, expectations are significantly
lower (DP ), indicating a general expectation of some sort of negative reci-
procity.
If in full information treatments the other agent receives 42, the expecta-
tion is reduced if oneself receives 21 (coefficient for DID21Dj42). This effect
can be explained by a lack of understanding of the dominance of effort for
w = 42: Subjects obviously believed that their own low wage reduces the
other agent’s confidence in them exerting effort and that this in turn reduces
the other one’s tendency to exert effort himself.
Again we observe an effect which is restricted to the case where the
other agent receives 42 and oneself only 21 in treatment FIP only: The
expectation that the other agent will exert effort increases significantly with
experience (DPDID21Dj42t). A similar learning effect could not be observed
for any other situation.
27For a brief description of experienced discrimination, see section 4.5.
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Table 3: Regression Analysis of Reported Belief
regressor coefficient regressor coefficient regressor coefficient
(p-value) (p-value) (p-value)
DP -18.66* DID21 3.95 DPDID21Dj42 20.02*
(.001) (.181) (.000)
DI 2.78 DIDj42 29.35* DPDID21Dj42t 1.80*
(.469) (.000) (.000)
D21 -2.18 DPDID21 -13.99*
(.191) (.000)
Dj42 -1.41 DID21Dj42 -18.77*
(.400) (.000)
σre 17.83 σu 23.21 R
2 (overall) .2075
Note: Linear random effects model estimated via GLS. Relevance of Subject
wise random effect confirmed by LM test. * significant at 2.5% level. ”(.000)”
implies p < .001
4.5 Further Results
Learning among Principals
Table 4 reports the parameter estimates from multinomial logit regressions
of the wage combination chosen by the principal, where the base case is the
(21, 21) offer.28 The first three columns are the effects on the three other
wage combinations in treatment FIP , the last three columns are those for
PIP . Model (1) and (2) already reveal that there is a significant repetition
effect on the discriminatory offers in FIP but not in PIP . In FIP the
tendency to offer a discriminatory combination increases significantly with
variable period. Note that as the frequency of (42, 42) offers remains con-
stant, this equally implies that (21, 21) is offered less often with experience.
Despite this significant increase with the number of repetitions, the ques-
tion is whether this is driven by learning from experience, i.e. whether prin-
cipals adapt to observed effort choices. In model (3) and (4) we added two
variables which summarize each principal’s experience with respect to his
agent’s cooperativeness in previous rounds. Here variable D(21,21)epast is
the average number of agents matched with the principal who exerted ef-
fort in case of wage (21, 21) in previous rounds. Similarly Dw1 6=w2e past
measures the same for discriminating wage offers. Both variables are zero in
case the principal has never offered this wage combination before. Observe
28All estimations include fixed effects on each subject, measuring the individual’s overall
tendency to offer a particular combination.
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Table 4: Multinomial Logit Regression of Wage Offers
FIP PIP
(21, 42) (42, 21) (42, 42) (21, 42) (42, 21) (42, 42)
model (1) (2)
Period 0.200* 0.234* -0.007 0.030 0.046 -0.076
(.0473) (.0522) (.1123) (.0427) (.0426) (.0895)
pseudo R2 .4242 .4653
model (3) (4)
Period 0.203* 0.218* 0.015 -0.001 0.002 -0.102
(.0606) (.0618) (.1550) (.0539) (.0500) (.1080)
D(21,21)epast -0.603 -0.835 -1.556 -1.004 -0.850 -0.697
(.6137) (1.104) (.8711) (.7392) (.6900) (1.611)
Dw1 6=w2epast -0.078 0.244 -0.026 0.564 0.883 0.469
(.4644) (.4197) (1.613) (.5500) (.5193) (.9619)
pseudo R2 .4287 .4723
Note: Parameter estimates of multinomial logit regressions (heteroscedasticity
robust standard errors). Estimations included fixed effects for every subject.
Pseudo R2 include subject effects. * significant at 2.5% level.
that for both treatments no learning from experienced effort choices can be
found, and that the period effect in treatment FIP remains significant.
Observation 8 Principals fundamentally learn to discriminate in treat-
ment FIP . Learning is not adaptive as it is not driven by experience.
Alternation of Discriminatory Pay
In the experimental procedure we decided to fix roles and to allow identifica-
tion of the two A roles. This allows a discriminating principal to offer equal
payoffs in expectation to both A’s by balancing the frequency of combina-
tion (21, 42) and (42, 21) over the 15 repetitions. On the aggregate level
this is clearly the case with a total of 79 offers of (21, 42) and 78 of (42, 21),
in treatment FIP and 73 vs. 67 in PIP . Looking on the individual level,
however, this becomes less clear. Allowing for a difference of 1 between the
frequencies of the two discriminatory offers,29 only 9 of the 20 subjects in
FIP held a balance of offers compared to 12 of 19 in treatment PIP . Allow-
ing for a difference of 2 the number increases to 15 in both treatments. Note,
29This is to account for the uneven number of rounds.
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however, that most subjects who held a balance only reached that balance
in late rounds. In each of the two treatments there is only one subject each
who alternated the discriminating offers whenever they made one. Allowing
for one break in the alternation, the number only increases to 4 and 6 in
FIP and PIP , respectively.
Individual Experience of Discrimination
A related question is how agents experienced discrimination over the 15 rep-
etitions. Only two agents, both in PIR, never experienced a discriminating
wage. For every period from 2 to 15 we identified all agents who up to that
round experienced discrimination at least once. Of those we calculated the
share who experienced both discriminatory wages equally often. This share
varies between 11% and 20% and in the very last round it is about 12% in
all four treatments. We can conclude that especially in early rounds dis-
crimination was salient and that even after 15 repetitions the overwhelming
majority experienced an overall discriminatory pay.
Efficiency and Payoffs
In our experiment full effort is efficient and, thus, our results on effort choices
indicate what treatments yielded the highest efficiency. As efficiency effects
are very strong this directly determines results on payoffs for both roles.
Observation 9 With respect to efficiency and payoffs there are two main
effects:30
1. It yields higher efficiency and higher payoffs for all roles, if the wage
is determined by the random mechanism rather than by the principal.
2. If wages are determined by the principal and workers have ample op-
portunity to learn, it is more efficient and yields higher payoffs for
everyone if coworkers are informed about each other’s payment.
Questionnaire
At the end of the experiment we asked subjects to answer a set of questions.
Some of these questions were designed to measure fairness preferences. As
we did not find any significant reciprocity effect other than the negative
reciprocity towards low payment in general (and by a subject principal in
detail), we refrain from analyzing this data in this paper.
One general question we asked was how someone behaved and why. It is
difficult to put answers to this question in simple categories, but there are
30Efficiency outcomes are compared by Fisher exact tests comparing the frequency dis-
tributions of 0, 1 or 2 total effort in the groups. Payoffs were compared by Wilcoxon rank
sum tests.
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some common themes to them. Overall the most often mentioned motives
which drove behavior were cooperation among workers, self interest, frustra-
tion about the behavior of others and envy (or outright spite) towards a very
high income of the principal. These motives were more or less mentioned
equally often in all treatments.
Other aspects mentioned in the answers such strategic considerations like
the conditioning of ones own effort choice on how likely the other agent was
believed to exert effort or the riskiness of certain decisions. Here a strong
difference between treatments is observable. With 18% and 16% compared
to only 2% and 3% of all meaningful answers, a conditioning of ones’s own
strategy was mentioned much more often in treatments FIP and PIP than
in FIR and PIR. Also, the treatments in which the wage was determined
by the principal had a much higher frequency of answers which described
or explained an advantage of a discriminatory payment (23% and 11% vs.
0% and 0%) - not all of which were given by principals. Similarly, 7% of
answers in each of the treatments in which the principal decides, indicate
that the subject fundamentally understood the incentives of the game. This
was not the case for any answer in the other two treatments. Equally,
these treatments show a much higher occurrence of answers which allow to
conclude that some form of adaptive or experiential learning took place.
(30% of meaningful answers in FIP and 11% in PIP compared to only 7%
in FIR and 0 in PIR).
5 Conclusions
Our study reports the first controlled laboratory study that explores the
effects of intentional wage discrimination on symmetric agents. In partic-
ular we argue that if discrimination of symmetric agents is perceived as
unfair then such unfair offers would be reciprocated by less effort. Based on
existing evidence we, furthermore, expected that principals shy away from
discrimination if it is observable.
We adopted the principal agent game by Winter (2004) which gives in-
centives to discriminate, as discrimination facilitates coordination among
workers. In our experiments we controlled for behavior along four dimen-
sions: Size of remuneration, discrimination, information about discrimina-
tion and intentionality of discrimination. Hereof the first two dimensions
were compared within subjects and either determined endogenously by the
principal or by a random draw conducted by a helper subject who was an
outsider to the experiment itself. The latter two dimensions were controlled
for exogenously in a between subjects comparison. With respect to inten-
tionality we argue that the random process resembles an environment in
which discrimination is not intentional and, thus, the hypothesized reci-
procity should not be observable (see, e.g. the results by Bolton et al.,
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2005). Furthermore, we asked agents to submit their expectation that the
other agent will exert effort.
Our main observation is that principals neither shy away from discrim-
ination, nor that subjects react negatively to it. However, agents react
negatively to receiving a low wage - irrespective of wether discriminatory or
not - especially if it was determined by a principal. It is important to stress
that especially in treatment FIP , i.e. in the case of observability of the
other agent’s wage, this indicates reciprocal behavior: Given the high effort
rates by high paid agents, a negatively discriminated agent very likely harms
not only the principal and the other agent but also himself by not exerting
effort. The effect is much higher in FIP than in FIR what implies that
at least the additional effect in FIP can not be due to equity preferences
which should influence both treatments the same. This emphasizes the role
of intentional discrimination – when the wage offers are determined by a
participating subject. In line with those findings is the lack of negative reci-
procity observed in Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2010) and Niklisch (2008) where
the wage offers were determined by the experimenter.
Under full information and intentional discrimination (FIP ) low paid
agents learn over time to exert effort and principals increasingly make dis-
criminating offers. This supports experimentally the theoretical predictions
of Winter (2004), that discrimination may enhance efficiency as a coordina-
tion device. Similar experimental observations were made by Goerg et al.
(2008), who find that discriminatory pay in a Winter (2004) game enhances
coordination and overall effort. At the same time effort rates for the (21, 21)
combination decrease even further. We don’t observe similar learning in
FIR where the wage is determined by the random process. We conjecture
two alternative explanations for this difference: One reason could lie in the
fact that in FIP discrimination is intentional which may initiate a more
thorough analysis of the game and, thus, learning. Alternatively the answer
may lie in the high effort rates in FIR already at the beginning of the ex-
periment. There is little room for learning, whereas in FIP agents learn
over time that under discriminatory pay they should not reciprocate a low
payment by exerting no effort.
One may argue that such reasoning is strengthened by equity concerns in-
duced by the asymmetric payoff structure of our experimental parametriza-
tion. Clearly, equity concerns may influence behavior. However, they can
only affect behavior equally in all four treatments and therefore our com-
parative effects are independent of equity preferences. Also, the fact that we
do observe reciprocal behavior towards low payment by a principal implies
that equity concerns do not crowd out reciprocity.
The main conclusion one can draw from our results is that, if discrimina-
tion of symmetric agents can enhance coordination in teams, then negative
discrimination itself has no adverse effect on working morale. This is an
important qualification of our main result. Although agents are symmetric,
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our game gave strong incentives to discriminate. Discriminatory pay was
optimal, as it is the cheapest wage combination inducing full effort (un-
der observability of wages) among all workers and full effort was efficient.
Rather, keeping wages a secret hinders coordination. Moreover, though over-
all principals did not offer worse wages than under observability, the partial
information on wages may have caused negative responses.
Even though one must be cautious when making policy advise based on
merely experimental observations, we think our results indicate the following
with respect to performance pay settings. The first implication suggests that
it is beneficial to justify low payment by outside factors. Anecdotal evidence
from the real world suggests that this is actually done. Low payment is
often excused to result from market pressures, obligations from contractual
agreements with unions or to restructuring initiatives suggested and planned
by external consultants. Often discriminatory pay appears random as well,
with team roles being attributed at random and being mostly attached to
meaningless titles but still determining the size of bonuses and premiums.
The second implication is that, if discrimination can enhance coordina-
tion in teams and a “randomization” of wages is not possible, discrimination
should be observable. At least in situations with a similar incentive struc-
ture to the Winter game, discriminatory pay enhances coordination among
team members, efficiency, and profits.
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6 Appendix: Experimental Instructions
Comment: These are the instructions translated from German for all four
treatments. When paragraphs differ this is indicated by
• R: Random,
• P: Principal,
• PI: partial info
• FIR: full info random,
• PIR: partial info random.
Anything unmarked was part of the instructions in all treatments.
Welcome to the experiment! Please cease any conversation with other
participants, turn off your cell phone and read the following instructions
carefully. If something is not clear, please raise your hand and we will come
to you and answer your questions individually.
R: One of you has been assigned the role of supervisor. His or her task
is to carry out the random moves. He did not get a copy of the instructions
and will not participate in the actual experiment.
The instructions are identical for all (R: other) participants. During the
experiment you remain anonymous. This means that no participant will
learn about your identity.
The experiment consists of two phases. In the first phase you have the
opportunity to familiarize yourself with the software and the rules of the
experiment in a non binding way. In the second phase you will interact in
15 repetitions (rounds) with other participants. You can earn money in each
of these 15 rounds. How much money you earn will depend on (R: a random
move, ) your own decisions, and those of other participants. However, only
one round will actually be paid. At the end of the experiment a random draw
will determine which round is relevant for payment. For each participant
the earnings are then calculated according to the earnings in that round.
During the experiment all sums of money are listed in ECU (for Ex-
perimental Currency Unit). Your earnings during the experiment will be
converted to Euro at the end and paid to you in cash. The exchange rate is
3 ECU = 1 Euro.
There are two roles in the experiment. One third of all participants will
be assigned the role of the employee M, the remaining two thirds will be
assigned the role of a worker A.31 The roles will be assigned at random and
31“Arbeitgeber M ” and “Arbeiter A” in German.
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remain unchanged throughout the experiment. In each round three partici-
pants interact: one M and two A (called A1 and A2 ). The composition of
the three participants will be newly assigned at random in each round. We
will make sure that nobody is assigned to a participant with whom he has
interacted in the previous round.
Course of a round
P: The employer M starts by deciding how much both workers A should
receive if both exert full effort. The employee M can choose for each
worker between a low and a high amount: 21 or 42 ECU. He can choose the
amount individually for each worker.
R: A random move decides how much both workers A should receive
if both exert full effort. The mechanism of the random move will be
explained in detail below. For each worker there is either a high or a low
amount: 21 or 42 ECU.
Taken together for the two workers there are four possibilities: (high,
high) (low, low) (low, high) and (high, low). A high amount makes effort
more attractive to the worker but is more costly to M.
Then, both workers (A1 and A2 ) learn their own as well as the other
workers amount (PI: only their own. . . ), and then individually decide whether
to exert effort. Effort increases the payoffs of all, but creates costs of 9 ECU
to the worker. Depending on the selected amounts for A1 and A2 (noted
as L1 and L2 each of which could either be 21 or 42) and on how many
workers decide to exert effort, the payoffs are calculated as follows.
The employee M receives:
If no worker exerts effort: 100−L1−L24
If one worker exerts effort: 100−L1−L22
If both workers exert effort: 100− L1 − L2
A worker with amount L receives:
If neither he nor the other worker exert effort: L4
If only he exerts effort, but the other not: L2 − 9
If the other worker exerts effort, but he himself does not: L2
If both workers exert effort: L− 9
How much each receives depending on L1 and L2 and on who exerts
effort is listed in detail in the table at the end of the instructions.
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FI: After each round all three participants learn which action each par-
ticipant chose and which payoff each of them would receive in case this round
is selected for payment. (”round income”)
PI: After each round all three participants learn which worker exerted
effort and their own payoff in case this round is chosen for payment. (”round
income”) The employee M is also informed about the income of both workers.
R: Random move
The random move determines the amounts for both workers in every round.
The mechanism works as follows: In a bowl there are 100 wooden chips,
numbered 1 to 100. Each chip corresponds to a particular combination of
both amounts. At the beginning of a round the supervisor draws a chip
from the bowl. The number on the chip determines the amount for worker
A1 and A2 according to a table as shown in figure 1.
—
FIR: This table shows in the second and third column the amounts for
A1 and A2. The first column assigns each combination of amounts to a set
of chip numbers. For example if the number 52 is drawn, A1 will receive 21
(low) and A2 will receive 42 (high).
The table is newly and independently created at the beginning of each
round for each group of three (consisting of M, A1 and A2 ). Thus it can
vary from round to round and group to group. In figure 2, for example, the
same chip number 52 leads to a combination of amounts of (low) 21, (low)
21.
The frequencies in each table for each combination of amounts is con-
stant: altogether 46 chip numbers lead to (21, 21); 26 chip numbers lead to
(21, 42); 26 chip numbers lead to (42, 21); and 2 chip numbers lead to (42,
42).
—
PIR: There are four columns in this table for M, for each possible combi-
nation of the amounts for A1 and A2. Each number from 1 to 100 is assigned
to one particular combination. For example, if the chip with number 55 is
drawn, A1 will be offered 21 (low) and A2 will be offered 42 (high).
For the two A participants in a particular group of three (each consisting
of one M, A1, and A2 ) the assignment of chip numbers for amounts L1 and
L2 is identical to the one for M. However, A1 and A2 will only see their
own amount which is determined by the draw. Figure 2 shows an example of
that screen for A1 and Figure 3 the corresponding figure for A2. In Figure
2 you can see that, as it does in the table for for M, chip 55 determines 21
(low) for A1. Correspondingly in Figure 3 chip 55 determines 42 (high) for
A2.
Thus, workers A1 and A2 only see their specific summary of the table
of M.
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Figure 4: Example for a table of the principal in PIR (not taken from actual
instructions).
The table is newly and independently created at the beginning of each
round for each group of three (consisting of M, A1 and A2 ). Thus it can
vary from round to round and group to group. In figure 4, for example, the
same chip number 55 leads to a combination of amounts of (low) 21, (low)
21.
The frequencies in each table for each combination of amounts is con-
stant: altogether 50 chip numbers lead to (21, 21); 25 chip numbers lead to
(21, 42); 22 chip numbers lead to (42, 21); and 3 chip numbers lead to (42,
42).
—
6.1 Procedure
(Identical in all treatments)
Next you will be given the opportunity to test the software in all roles for five
minutes. You will simulate all three participants. Nothing you are doing during
these five minutes will affect your payment. Also, no other participant will be
informed about your input.
The five minutes testing phase is followed by the second phase. You will first
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(a) Agent A1
(b) Agent A2
Figure 5: Example for tables of the agents in PIR (not taken from actual
instructions). Equivalent to situation pictured in table 4
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learn your role (M or A) before you run through 15 rounds as described above.
At the beginning of each round you are assigned to two other participants. Under
no circumstances you will meet the same participants you interacted with in the
previous round.
Between your decisions we will ask for your expectations regarding the decision
of the other participants. This has no impact on your payoffs nor will it be revealed
to any other participant.
At the end we will ask you to answer in a short questionnaire.
If you have read and understood everything, please click ”continue” on your
computer screen.
6.2 Payoff Table
Offer A1 A2 Payoff in ECU
A1(low), A2(low) no no 14.50 5.25 5.25
no yes 29.00 10.50 1.50
yes no 29.00 1.50 10.50
yes yes 58.00 12.00 12.00
A1(low), A2(high) no no 9.25 5.25 10.50
no yes 18.50 10.50 12.00
yes no 18.50 1.50 21.00
yes yes 37.00 12.00 33.00
A1(high), A2(low) no no 9.25 10.50 5.25
no yes 18.50 21.00 1.50
yes no 18.50 12.00 10.50
yes yes 37.00 33.00 12.00
A1(high), A2(high) no no 4.00 10.50 10.50
no yes 8.00 21.00 12.00
yes no 8.00 12.00 21.00
yes yes 16.00 33.00 33.00
Examples
• Assume A1 gets a ”low” and A2 a ”high” offer If both exert effort, M gets
37 ECU, A1 12 ECU and A2 33 ECU. If none exerts effort, M receives 9.25
ECU, A1 5.25 ECU and A2 10,50 ECU. etc...
• Assume both A1 and A2 receive a ”high” offer. If none exerts effort, M
receives 4ECU, A1 10,50ECU and A2 10,50ECU If A1 exerts effort but A2
not, then M receives 8ECU, A1 12ECU and A2 21ECU etc.
• Assume both A1 and A2 receive a ”low” offer. If none exerts effort, M receives
14,50ECU, A1 5,25ECU and A2 5,25ECU If A1 exerts effort but A2 not, then
M receives 29ECU, A1 1,50ECU and A2 10,50ECU etc.
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